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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since the attack on Beardianism triumphed in the midst of the Cold
War, American theoretical discussions of historical method have regularly
degenerated into subtle and not-so-subtle Marx-bashing.' As Charles Beard
became the American stand-in for Marx during the 1950's, methodological
discussion simultaneously acquired many of the nasty rhetorical forms that
were present in the chorus of red-baiting in American culture generally.
2
Ultimately, the intellectual deformations wrought by Cold War culture led to
the disappointing lack of serious discussion of theory or methodology that has
long characterized the field of American history.3
It comes as quite a relief, therefore, to discover that a sophisticated debate
on the relationship between capitalism and slavery can now take place without
eliciting in spectators the feeling that it is actually a stand-in for real or
imagined positions about the Cold War. The essays in this collection are
hopefully an early anticipation of a post-Cold War movement to free historical
discussions of capitalism from stale stereotypes and polemics. Yet, at the same
time, these essays reveal the extent to which we are still captive to theoretical
formulations that emerged under the pressures of the Cold War.
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The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in
Historical Interpretation4 captures one of the most important and interesting
discussions of historical methodology that has ever taken place in America. As
in the great debates among English historians over the enclosure movement,"
or the rise and fall of the gentry,6 or over cultural and scientific Marxism,
7
the most important precondition for an illuminating methodological discussion
is satisfied, namely that the controversy focus on a particular, concrete problem
in historical interpretation.
This debate emerged in 1985 after Thomas L. Haskell challenged, in the
pages of the American Historical Review,8 a certain interpretation of the
relationship between capitalism and abolitionist thought in David Brion Davis'
monumental study, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution.9 Davis
initially seemed shocked that Haskell had chosen to focus on only a small
portion of this brilliant and sweeping two-volume comparative study of the
history of antislavery thought. Davis' initial wariness, I suspect, was based on
some concern that another red-baiting ambush was about to take place, one
that he had taken pains to anticipate in his study. But it turns out that Haskell
raised some big questions in a respectful and non-demagogic way; that John
Ashworth, an English historian, responded thoughtfully to Haskell,10 and that
Davis himself finally joined the discussion with energy and enthusiasm." The
result is this thought-provoking collection, edited with a fine introduction by
Thomas Bender.
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II. EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND CAPITALISM
The question posed by Davis about the English abolitionist movement was:
"Why did a seemingly liberal movement emerge and continue to win support
from major government leaders in the period from 1790 to 1832, a period
characterized by both political reaction and industrial revolution?' 2 More
generally, Davis asked, what explains the surprising surge of abolitionist
thought after 1750, given that for thousands of years slavery had been widely
accepted (except by slaves) as part of the natural order of things? What needed
explaining was not only the sharp shift in opinion after 1750, but, more
specifically, the emergence of antislavery opinion in a period otherwise
characterized by "political reaction and industrial revolution."'3
Davis' question regarding the startling movement after 1750 was thus
twofold. He queried, first, why those denial mechanisms with which "middle-
class Englishmen learned to screen out most of the oppression and suffering
in their midst '"'4 could no longer suffice to suppress recognition of the evils
of slavery. Second, and just as significantly, Davis asked how Englishmen
could continue to deny the evils of capitalism while pointedly ignoring any
analogy between chattel slavery and what was frequently called "wage
slavery."
Davis' single answer is that "[t]he emergence of an international
antislavery opinion represented a momentous turning point in the evolution of
man's moral perception, and thus in man's image of himself. [It] did not
spring from transcendent sources: as a historical artifact, it reflected the
ideological needs of various groups and classes."' 5 For Davis, the emergence
of humanitarianism and abolitionism needed to be understood, in a complex
and dialectical way, as part of the emergence of capitalism. "The antislavery
movement, like [Adam] Smith's political economy, reflected the needs and
values of the emerging capitalist order," in Davis' view.' 6 "The paramount
question . . . is how antislavery reinforced or legitimized such [class]
hegemony."'
17
Haskell challenges Davis' assumption that class interest is the only
important link between these screening mechanisms-ideologies-and the
system of capitalism. Furthermore, Haskell proposes that capitalism promoted
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a "cognitive style" that emphasized the interdependence of causation and hence
the expansion of moral responsibility. 8
There is much that is interesting, especially for legal historians, in
Haskell's formulation. It derives from Sir Henry Maine's idea of a shift from
"status" to "contract,"' 9 which, among other things, can be understood as a
contribution to the universalization of moral responsibility. Haskell devotes a
good deal of energy to discussing the "growing reliance on mutual promises,
or contractual relations," produced by market society.20 "Historically
speaking," Haskell writes, "capitalism requires conscience and can even be said
to be identical with the ascendancy of conscience.
'21
There are many problems with Haskell's formulation, not the least of
which is the excessively abstract nature of his claim. As Ashworth delicately
notes, "The market ... had contradictory effects.... Certainly, [Haskell] was
at pains to emphasize the positive effects of the market."22 Haskell also seems
to have ignored Davis' specific methodological claim that the problem
requiring explanation is not only the relationship of capitalism to
humanitarianism, but also the flourishing of antislavery opinion in a period
otherwise known for its political reaction and flight from humanitarianism.
But Haskell and Ashworth do raise important questions about how Davis
defines capitalism. Is capitalism to be seen as a primarily class-based system
with each class having distinct and definable "interests," as Davis sees it?
23
Should it be thought of primarily in terms of the emergence and expansion of
the "market," as Haskell proposes? Or should capitalism be regarded as
essentially involving the emergence of wage labor, as Ashworth suggests?
Which of these definitions prevails may determine the likelihood that the focus
of the debate will stay on Davis' primary interpretive concern-why the
abolitionists failed to turn their moral onslaught against the institution of "wage
slavery." To Davis, the success of the abolitionists in screening out wage
slavery from their moral consciousness is a problem that needs to be explained.
For if abolitionism was indeed a subclass of humanitarianism, then one would
have expected its critique to be extended. But if the abolitionist failure is
instead understood as reinforcing a "hegemonic ideology" of free labor and
self-interest, as Ashworth proposes, then one can legitimately see abolitionism
in England as a mechanism to displace the emerging moral problems of
capitalism.24
18. Pp. 111.
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In addition to the very rich discussion of the meaning of class interest and
capitalism, Haskell raises questions about how one defines ideology. "By
insisting that the reformers were unaware of the hegemonic function served by
their ideology," Haskell writes, Davis created a discontinuity "between their
intentions and the long-term consequences of their ideas and activities.... To
say that a person is moved by class interest is to say that he intends to further
the interests of his class, or it is to say nothing at all." '
Ashworth also considers Haskell wrong on this point, though he faults
Davis. Ashworth writes:
Davis has only himself to blame for talking about self-deception and
thus opening himself to Haskell's criticism. Davis ought to have
focused on 'false consciousness,' the notion that the awareness of
historical actors is incomplete, with the result that they misperceive
the world around them. . . .But Haskell's objection to the idea of
self-deception is quite justified. The way out of this impasse lies,
quite simply, in a recognition that society rather than the individual
generates false consciousness. 2
6
Ashworth's criticism of Davis strikes me as misconceived. Davis' concept of
ideology is precisely an attempt to talk about self-deception on a societal scale,
analogous to psychoanalytic theories of individual self-deception. 27 The real
question here is whether there is a difference, as Ashworth insists there is,
between self-deception and false consciousness. If there is such a difference,
which I doubt, it is that deception entails the use of mental screening devices
and other forms of intellectual denial, whereas false consciousness proceeds
from the disjunction between unmediated thought and "reality."
In its original nineteenth-century usage, ideology also implied a false or
distorted picture of reality, in much the same way as the word "myth" once
suggested falsehood. But if we surrender the idea that the truth value of
thought can be tested for its unmediated correspondence with reality, then the
notion of false consciousness must be revised. One can no longer simply say
that it is false consciousness for the abolitionists not to have extended their
critique to wage slavery. Ashworth's position is thus untenable.
Relation in English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870 (1991). Steinfeld traces the history of
indentured servitude in America to determine whether, at a given time, it was analogized to chattel slavery,
at one pole, or to contractual labor, at the other. In the colonial period, Steinfeld shows, indentured
servitude was regarded as a form of free labor, but during the nineteenth century it increasingly came to
be regarded as closer to chattel slavery. He thus treats indentured servitude as a "mediating" category that
illuminates the changing ideological justifications for both slavery and free labor.
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I agree with Ashworth that Haskell's definition of ideology is wrong and
entirely unnecessary to his argument, though my analysis differs. The most
important question in my view is why Haskell feels compelled to insist on
evidence of intentionality, evidence which is ordinarily unavailable to answer
the most complex of historical inquiries. Haskell cannot stand by this claim
unless he wishes completely to eliminate the indispensable concept of
ideology.
Here is where I believe Cold War debates have seriously distorted the
canons of historical interpretation. The discrediting of "false consciousness" as
an analytical mode calls to mind Cold War polemics about how the concept
could be used to justify Stalin, the Gulag, and the policy of "forcing people to
be free."28 Beginning in the 1950's as part of the attack on Beard, American
historians have delighted in discrediting as a "conspiracy theory" any historical
inference not documented with concrete proof of intentionality.29 Under such
rigorous methodological constraints, every discussion of ideology could be
condemned as a conspiracy theory, and the only questions that realistically
could be answered required highly individualized and biographical modes of
proof.
I do agree with Ashworth that we cannot do without the concept of false
consciousness. 30 But until we are able to reformulate the concept to eliminate
its original connection to a naive realist epistemology, it cannot serve as a
useful way of talking about ideology. Davis' book is one of the most
impressive efforts by an American historian to deploy rigorously the idea of
false consciousness. Yet, since the denaturalizing of "interest" has encouraged
historians to return to "intention" as the only remaining empirical reality,
unless we can revive an idea of interest as a social construction, not as an
objective manifestation of the desires or needs of a particular class or group,
we will not have any anchor for the indispensable concept of ideology.
Capitalism, it seems to me, is too broad, too historically varied, and in a post-
Marxist world, too disputable a concept to serve as such an anchor.
28. See J. L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY 38-49, 147 (1985).
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